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Abstract
More and more the engineering of complex agent-based systems calls for infrastructural support
for coordination and security issues integrated with services for the description and management
of system organisation. This trend is evident in the state-of-the-art models adopted for the man-
agement of security and organisation of complex information systems: in this context Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) models are emerging as a reference architecture for integrating security
issues – access control in particular – and (role-based) organisation management. In this paper we
discuss how an RBAC-like model has been fruitfully exploited to extend an infrastructure for the
coordination of agent-based systems – TuCSoN – with the support for organisation and security
management, in particular as far as access control is concerned.
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1 Introduction
Coordination and security are strictly related issues in the engineering of in-
teraction within complex software systems. In fact, both coordination and
security aim at establishing laws and rules specifying and constraining the
space of system interaction [5]. The design and implementation of models
and infrastructures for coordination and security in synergy provide several
beneﬁts, in terms of abstraction, conceptual integrity, and formalisability [16].
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When engineering complex software system adopting agent-oriented ab-
stractions, organisation emerges as another fundamental dimension [22]. Not
surprisingly, this dimension is strictly related to coordination and security: it
can be considered as the static counterpart of them, specifying parts (typically
agents playing roles in groups) deﬁning system structures, and relationships
between them (agent-role and inter-role relationships). Such relationships
statically shape the space of the possible interactions that can dynamically
occur.
The connection between organisation and security is quite apparent in Role
Based Access Control (RBAC) models / architectures, which are currently
considered as the most promising approach in the engineering of security – in
particular of access control – in complex information systems [21]. RBAC ma-
jor features are on the one side the ability to articulate and enforce enterprise
(system) speciﬁc security policies and to streamline the burdensome process
of security management [7]: with respect to the previous approaches (discre-
tionary and mandatory access control), RBAC models allow for a more ﬂexible
and detailed control and management of security. On the other side, RBAC
approaches make it possible to specify security policies in terms of organisa-
tion abstractions – such as roles, role permissions and inter-role relationships
–, so as to easily integrate security in contexts where organisation is explicitly
deﬁned with such abstractions. Recent works also emphasise the eﬀectiveness
of adopting RBAC approaches for supporting organisation and security at
the infrastructure level for system heavily based on coordination: among the
others, the most relevant example are Workﬂow Management Systems [9,3,1].
In this paper we claim that RBAC-like models can be suitably introduced
in MAS (multi-agent system) coordination models and infrastructures, inte-
grating a high-level role-based security approach with agent-based coordina-
tion and organisation, where the role abstraction is already at play. MAS
organisational models based on roles are typically exploited as analysis and
design tools: conversely, adopting an RBAC-like model in the context of MASs
shifts (or completes) the focus on the runtime aspects: roles, sessions, policies
become runtime issues of a MAS organisation, dynamically manageable by
means of suitable services provided by the infrastructure. In the same way
as RBAC approaches have brought at the infrastructure level security issues
that were previously addressed at the application level, we aim at factoring out
security issues that most frequently emerge in the engineering of distributed
systems as MAS, extending agent infrastructures with suitable services, inte-
grated with the MAS organisation / coordination model.
In the overall, RBAC models are interesting also in the MAS context be-
cause they properly frame security issues in an organisation context, grounding
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the framework on abstractions that are basic building blocks of the organi-
sation model (roles, policies, etc). This provides a good level of conceptual
integrity in MAS engineering. Also, RBAC models make it possible to specify
and enforce security properties despite of the heterogeneity and the openness
possibly characterising the (multi-agent) systems. On the one side, the same
model can be applied in the context of MASs composed by agents with hetero-
geneous computational models, ranging from reactive to cognitive based ones.
On the other side, the model copes well with the openness typically featured
by MASs, thanks to the dynamism of the system structure (e.g., the set of
agents), and of the organisational / coordination policies as well.
Then, this paper discusses how an RBAC-like architecture can be conceived
in the context of a MAS coordination infrastructure, exploiting in particular
the notion of agent coordination context (ACC) introduced in [13]. From the
general case we will focus on a speciﬁc agent-based coordination infrastructure
– TuCSoN –, by discussing its extension with an RBAC-like architecture.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide
an overview of the RBAC approach and of the reference architecture consid-
ered as a standard in the literature. In Section 3, we illustrate an RBAC-like
model for MAS based on coordination infrastructures. Then, in Section 4
we discuss a concrete realisation of the integration of the RBAC model in
the TuCSoN coordination infrastructure, and illustrate some examples of the
approach. Section 5 describes a more articulated example of distributed work-
ﬂow management. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and brieﬂy discuss related
works and future research directions.
2 RBAC Model Overview
In RBAC, a role is properly viewed as a semantic construct around which
access control policies are formulated, bringing together a particular collection
of users and permissions, in a transitory way. The role concept has several
manifestations, which RBAC aims to accommodate and capture. Generally
speaking, in RBAC a role can represent competency to do speciﬁc tasks, such
as a physician or a pharmacist; but also the embodiment of authority and
responsibility, such as in the case of a project supervisor [21].
The RBAC approach makes it possible to establish relations between roles,
between permissions and roles, and between users and roles. For example, two
roles can be established as being mutually exclusive, so that the same user is
not allowed to take on both roles. By means of inheritance relations, one role
can inherit permissions assigned to a diﬀerent role. Such inter-role relations
can be used to enforce security policies that include separation of duties and
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Fig. 1. RBAC Reference Model. SSD stands for Static Separation of Duties, while DSD stands for
Dynamic Separation of Duties [8].
delegation of authority. Separation of duties is achieved by ensuring that
mutually exclusive roles are invoked to complete a sensitive task, such as
requiring both an accounting clerk and an account manager to participate in
issuing a check.
With separation of duties, RBAC directly supports other two well-known
security principles: least privilege and data abstraction. Least privilege is sup-
ported because RBAC can be conﬁgured so that only the permissions required
for the tasks conducted by members of the role are assigned to the role. From
this point of view RBAC can be considered only an enabling model: it is up
to administrators to exploit its features to specify permissions reﬂecting the
least privilege property. Data abstraction is supported by means of abstract
permissions such as credit and debit for an account object, rather than the
read, write, execute permissions typically provided by the operating system.
In spite of the support for such principles, RBAC is said to be policy neutral,
since it does not enforce by itself any speciﬁc access policy.
Summing up, RBAC provides for encapsulation of security policies. Access
control strategy is encapsulated in various components of RBAC such as role-
permission, user-role and role-role relationships. These components, dynami-
cally conﬁgurable by system administrators, collectively determine whether a
particular user will be allowed to access a particular piece of data (or, more
generally, a particular resource) in the system. Moreover, RBAC makes it pos-
sible and easy to incrementally evolve access control policies along the system
life cycle, in order to meet the ever-changing needs of an organisation.
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2.1 The Reference Architecture
According to the reference architecture formally deﬁned in [8], the main com-
ponents of an RBAC model are depicted in Fig. 1, deﬁned in terms of basic
element sets and their relationships. The basic element sets are users (USERS),
roles (ROLES), objects (OBJS), operations (OPS), permissions (PERMS) and ses-
sions (SESSIONS). Users are assigned to roles and permissions to roles. A role
is understood as a job function within the context of an organisation with
some associated semantics regarding the authority and responsibilities con-
ferred to the user assigned to the role. A permission is an approval to perform
an operation on one or more protected objects. The semantics of the term
operation and object depends on the speciﬁc cases. Each session is a mapping
between a user and an activated subset of roles that are assigned to the users.
Each session is associated with a single user and each user is associated with
one or more sessions. Hierarchies are a natural means for structuring roles
in order to reﬂect an organisation’s line of authority and responsibilities, and
deﬁne an inheritance relationship among the roles: role R1 inherits role R2 if
all the privileges of R2 are also privileges of R1 .
Security policies are deﬁned in terms of relationships between the element
sets. User assignment relationships deﬁne which users are assigned of a speciﬁc
role, which means that they are allowed to play that role inside the organi-
sation; permission assignment deﬁnes which permissions are assigned to each
role. Static separation of duty properties (SSD) are obtained by enforcing
constraints on the assignment of users to roles. Instead, dynamic separation
of duty properties (DSD) are obtained by placing constraints on the roles that
can be activated within or across a user sessions.
3 RBAC for MAS Coordination Infrastructures
Adopting RBAC components as ﬁrst class abstractions in the context of MASs
– and in particular, of MAS coordination infrastructures – is quite straightfor-
ward. It is natural to map users onto agents, being them both characterised by
some degree of autonomy, situated into an environment where they interact,
in terms of inter-agent communication as well as of the exploitation of shared
environmental resources. In the same way as a user in an RBAC system can
assume and activate multiple roles at the same time, an agent can play multi-
ple and heterogeneous roles inside the same organisation, with diﬀerent kind
of permissions to access resources hosted by the infrastructure.
In the case of MASs exploiting coordination infrastructures – as in the case
of TuCSoN, discussed in next section –, coordination media play a peculiar role
among the resources ruled by access control. The integration of RBAC con-
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Fig. 2. An RBAC-like Model using ACCs. SSD stands for Static Separation of Duties, while DSD
stands for Dynamic Separation of Duties.
cepts is straightforward in particular when considering infrastructure models
promoting the vision of coordination media as coordination artifacts [19], that
is, as persistent ﬁrst class entities that agents share and use to exploit some
kind of coordination service, by executing the operations supported by the
artifacts. Coordination artifacts can then be considered as the target objects
of users operations in the RBAC model.
The mapping of RBAC concepts onto MAS abstractions can be completed
by identifying the RBAC notion of session, which is the key abstraction that
links at runtime users to roles and makes it possible to enforce permissions,
realising forms of role-based access control. The agent coordination context
abstraction (ACC), introduced in [13] and formally described in [16], can be
fruitfully adopted for the purpose.
3.1 Agent Coordination Contexts for RBAC
ACC has been introduced in [13] as the conceptual place where to set the
boundary between the agent and the environment, so as to encapsulate the
interface that enables agent actions and perceptions inside the environment.
More precisely, an ACC (i) works as a model for the agent environment, by
describing the environment where an agent can interact, and (ii) enables and
rules the interactions between the agent and the environment, by deﬁning the
space of the admissible agent interactions. The control room can be used as a
useful metaphor for understanding the role and use of an ACC [13]. According
to this metaphor, an agent entering a new environment is assigned its own
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control room, which is the only way in which it can perceive the environment,
as well as the only way in which it can interact. The control room oﬀers
the agent a set of admissible inputs (lights, screens,. . . ), admissible outputs
(buttons, cameras,. . . ). How many input and output devices are available
to agents, of what sort, and for how much time, is what deﬁnes the control
room conﬁguration, that is, the speciﬁc ACC. So, the ACC abstraction can
be fruitfully exploited to model the presence or position of an agent within an
organisation, in terms of its admissible actions with respect to organisation
resources and its admissible communications toward the other agents of the
organisation.
Two basic stages characterise the ACC dynamics: ACC negotiation and
ACC use. An ACC is meant to be negotiated by the agents with the MAS
infrastructure, in order to start a working session inside an organisation. The
agent asks for an ACC by specifying which roles to activate. If the agent
request is compatible with (current) organisation rules, a new ACC is created,
conﬁgured according to the characteristics of the speciﬁed roles, and then
released to the agent for active playing inside the organisation. The agent can
then use the ACC to interact with other agents in the organisation, and with
the organisation environment, by exploiting the actions / perceptions enabled
by the ACC.
In the context of the RBAC reference architecture, the ACC naturally
embodies the concept of session, by dynamically coupling agents (as users)
and the organisation environment. Then, ACCs represent the runtime entities
that physically enable and constraint agent actions, according to rules which in
the RBAC framework correspond to the role-permission relationships. Fig. 2
illustrates the use of the ACC for realising an RBAC architecture in MAS
exploiting a coordination infrastructure based on the notion of coordination
artifact: the RBAC objects are the coordination artifacts available for agent
coordination, and RBAC operations are operations over artifacts, which agent
can execute in order to exploit their coordination service. The RBAC notion of
permission is extended to the notion of policy, specifying rules concerning the
execution of patterns of operations (protocols), not only individual operation.
As already mentioned, agents are the users of the systems, and the ACCs
play the role of sessions. An agent can hold multiple ACCs at a time, for each
organisation in which it is playing; the same ACC can involve the activation of
multiple roles, and the same role can be played simultaneously within diﬀerent
ACCs.
ACC negotiation is ruled by both currently deﬁned agent-role relationships
(deﬁning the SSD rules in Fig. 2) and inter-role relationships (used for deﬁning
DSD rules). The former are described with rules deﬁning static agent-role
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assignment, so as to specify which agents are allowed to play a role or what
credentials or characteristics they must exhibit. The latter describe instead
constraints on agent entrance, considering the dynamic roles that the agent
aims at activating. Examples of relationships typically used for this purpose
are role-exclusion rules (if an agent has activated a role R1, it cannot activate
a role R2 ) and role-inclusion rules (in order to activate role R1 the agent
should be playing role R2, yet). Actually, in our case, no real diﬀerences
hold between SSD and DSD, since both are applied and enforced during ACC
negotiation, which is always dynamic.
Once the properly conﬁgured ACC has been released to the agent (after
a successful negotiation), the relationships deﬁned among roles and policies
as depicted in Fig. 2 shape the agent action space as enabled by the ACC,
deﬁning what actions – as operations within the environment – the agent is
allowed to execute. Actually, the ACC model makes it possible to specify not
only rules on the individual actions, but also articulated patterns of actions
and interaction protocols, introducing also timing constraints. For this pur-
pose, a formal semantics of ACC based on process algebra has been deﬁned
[16], providing a formal speciﬁcation of the individual role policies and of their
composition. The deﬁnition of a formal semantics is the ﬁrst step toward a
scenario where automated tools are exploited to verify the satisfaction of for-
mal properties concerning role policies. This is a very important and complex
issue when adopting a principled approach to the engineering of security.
An agent can dynamically update an ACC currently held, by requesting
to activate / deactivate roles. The request can be accepted or rejected again
according to the rules enforcing the separation of duties inside an organisation.
Finally, the ACC can be exploited to play the role of the infrastructure
abstraction that deﬁnes and encapsulates issues related to quality of service,
and, in particular, of the communication between the agent owning the ACC
and the organisation. So the ACC not only represents and enforces policy
concerning agent role(s), but deﬁnes properties of interaction, established and
tuned during ACC negotiation. Among the properties, we include also secure
communication: the ACC can apply security techniques related to authentica-
tion – for instance classic cryptographic techniques based on standards (such
as PKI infrastructure) – to secure agent / organisation interaction. Such fea-
tures are necessary for instance when guarantees are needed against intruders,
reading and altering information involved in agent / organisation interaction:
in particular, in the case of TuCSoN – discussed in next section – informa-
tion is represented by the logic tuples placed in, and read / removed from the
coordination abstractions.
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Fig. 3. The RBAC-like architecture specialised for TuCSoN.
4 Experiments in TuCSoN
The TuCSoN coordination model [17] was already extended in order to deal
with security and topology issues [4]. The access control model adopted,
however, was unrelated from organisation speciﬁcation and management. By
integrating an RBAC-like architecture we extend the previous approach by
explicitly considering access control as linked to organisation structures and
rules.
From the coordination point of view, TuCSoN is based on the tuple centre
coordination abstraction: tuple centres are programmable tuple spaces, whose
behaviour can be tailored to the application needs by deﬁning a set of speciﬁ-
cation tuples expressed in the ReSpecT language, deﬁning how a tuple centre
should react to incoming / outgoing communication events [14]. So, unlike
tuple spaces, tuple centres can be programmed with reactions so as to en-
capsulate coordination laws directly in the coordination media. Tuple centres
can then be conceived as general-purpose customisable coordination artifacts,
whose behaviour can be dynamically speciﬁed, forged and adapted so as to
support the coordination activities among agents [19]. Also, tuple centres are
thought to mediate agent access to organisation resources, acting as a kind of
virtual proxies of the resources and embedding coordination policies governing
their use.
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From a topology viewpoint, tuple centres are spread over the network, col-
lected in the nodes of the infrastructure. The nodes are grouped in domains :
each domain is characterised by a gateway node – where administration tuple
centres are collected – and by place nodes, hosting tuple centres for speciﬁc ap-
plication purposes. A place can be the gateway itself for another (sub)domain,
making it possible to realise hierarchies of domains [5].
From the organisation point of view, a TuCSoN system is deﬁned as an or-
ganisation dynamically structured in societies, as instances of society classes
(acting as a template). A society class groups a set of roles; each role is char-
acterised by a policy, deﬁning the actions and interaction protocols allowed
for agents playing such a role. Tuple centres can be considered then as organi-
sation resources accessible by agents joining the organisation. From this point
of view, bringing the RBAC model to TuCSoN makes it possible to explicitly
describe not only available organisation structures such as roles, societies and
society classes, but also the organisation rules that deﬁne the (static and dy-
namic) separation of duties. A key point is that both the structures and the
rules (in terms of agent-role and inter-role relationships) are described as tu-
ples and stored in speciﬁc tuple centres of the organisation. (For more details
about the ontology currently adopted for the description of the organisation
see [15].) This choice makes it possible to inspect and change dynamically
the organisation structures and relationships, both by humans and agents, by
suitably reading and changing the content of the involved tuple centres.
The ACC abstraction is exploited to embody an agent working session
inside a TuCSoN organisation, enforcing the forms of access control speciﬁed
by the policies related to agent role(s). As an overall picture, Fig. 3 shows
the RBAC-like architecture of Fig. 2 specialised to the TuCSoN case. Tuple
centres are the objects, and the tuple centre coordination primitives are the
operations. ORG represents a TuCSoN organisation, composed by societies.
An agent action has the form: Tid @ Node ? op , where Tid is the tuple centre
identiﬁer, Node is the TuCSoN node hosting the tuple centre and op is the
coordination primitive on tuple centres (in, out, rd, rdp, set spec, get spec
– the last ones used to set and inspect the behaviour speciﬁcation of the tuple
centre). Permissions as found in the RBAC model are expressed here in terms
of rules on allowed actions / interactions and their aggregation as protocols –
i.e. role policies, described in next sections. From the dynamic point of view,
an agent negotiates with the infrastructure service of an organisation an ACC
specifying which roles to activate in which societies. The agent request is
accepted only if it is compatible with the agent-role assignment and the inter-
role relationships. After a successful negotiation, the agent receives an ACC
whose policy reﬂects the composition of the policies deﬁned for the individual
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roles activated.
4.1 Role Policy Description
A key point in the RBAC model is access control, in terms of the laws that rule
agent access to resources according to their roles. Analogously, a key point
of RBAC in TuCSoN is the description of the policies deﬁning the patterns of
actions and interactions allowed for a role. Role policies are described through
ﬁrst-order logic (Prolog-like) theory, meant to be (dynamically) speciﬁed by
the agent / human administrator of an organisation.
Actually, the policies deﬁne the constraining behaviour of the ACC released
to an agent: in particular, from an engineering point of view, an ACC locally
ﬁlters allowed (patterns of) actions requested by the owning agent, by verifying
their admissibility through a Prolog engine running over the role policy theory.
Such a theory is composed by a set of can do rules deﬁning role action
space:
can do(CurrentState,Action,NextState ):- Conditions.
This rule means that the Action can be executed in the role state CurrentState
if Conditions hold: in that case, next role state is NextState . Actions are the
execution of operation on tuple centres, as previously discussed.
The concept of role state is used as a way to easily express interaction
protocols; any Prolog term – also structured, partially speciﬁed – can be used
to denote the role state. By default, the starting state is denoted by the init
atom. CurrentState and NextState can be omitted, using the any Prolog symbol
( ): omitting the CurrentState information amounts to stating the validity of
the rules for every possible state; omitting the NextState information amounts
to keeping current state as next state. Action denotes an agent action, as
described in previous subsection – in the case of the TuCSoN model, a coordi-
nation primitive performed on a tuple centre. Actually, Conditions can contain
also built-in predicates useful to describe context-aware (with respect to lo-
cal time, space and identity / positions of the agents) policies. Among the
predicates, here we mention: agent id(-ID ) (retrieving the identity of the agent
owner the ACC), local node(-Node ) (retrieving the node hosting the agent),
session time(-TimeInMillis ) (retrieving the number of milliseconds passed since
the release of the ACC) 4 .
So, given a role policy theory, an action is admitted for the speciﬁc role if
and only if there is a can do rule which holds for it. In other words, an action
4 This value refers to the time when the ACC accepts the request execution for the action.
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Action is allowed if the goal 5
?- can do(+CurrentState,+Action,-NextState ).
can be demonstrated, given the role policy theory. So, for instance a rule of
the kind
can do( , , ).
means that every action is allowed. Instead,
can do( ,Action, ).
means that the action Action can be always executed. By specifying the body
of the rules, also speciﬁc forbidden actions can be expressed:
can do( ,Act, ) :- Act \= Action.
means that every action can be executed but actions matching with Action
template. Actually, such a Prolog encoding makes it easy to map the formal
language based on process algebras deﬁned in [16].
More precisely, the role state is denoted not by an individual term, but by
a list of terms, or state tokens, in order to allow the simultaneous engagement
of multiple interaction protocols. So, given a Prolog list L representing current
role state, every can do(S,A,D ) rule whose state token S is in L is considered
when evaluating permissions concerning action A . If a rule of this type holds,
then the state token S is substituted by D in the role state (list). If D is ,
then S is not substituted. If D already occurs in the list, then it is not added:
only one instance for each state token is allowed.
In order not to substitute, but rather to add new state token to the role
state list (for opening a new interaction protocol), a variant of previous rule
can be used:
can do(CurrentState,Action,+ NextState ):- Conditions.
The eﬀect of this rule – when satisﬁed – is to add NextState to the role state
list, instead of replacing CurrentState .
The ACC policy is deﬁned by composing the individual policies of the roles
which the ACC represents. Actually, the Prolog theory deﬁning the ACC over-
all policy is obtained by simply composing the individual theories, and adding
the meta-rules that deﬁne theory composition:
can do(comp(S1,S2 ),Action,comp(S1Next,S2 )):-
can do(S1,Action,S1Next ).
can do(comp(S1,S2 ),Action,comp(S1,S2Next )):-
5 The basic Prolog notation is adopted for describing argument of operations: + means an
output argument, - an input argument, ? an input / output argument.
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can do(S2,Action,S2Next ).
There, comp(S1,S2 ) is the logic state of an ACC composing two roles.
The composition property is used recursively: for three roles we have
comp(S1,comp(S2,S3 )), for four comp(S1,comp(S2,comp(S3,S4 ))), and so on. The se-
mantics of the composition is: an action is allowed if and only if it is allowed
according to the policy of the ﬁrst role or, if this condition is not satisﬁed, of
the second. This is the semantics of the parallel operator as deﬁned in pro-
cess algebras, with a diﬀerence: the approach adopted here implicitly speciﬁes
an order between the roles, aﬀecting also the order in which the rules are
considered (which is not the case in process algebras).
Actually, the ACC model does not constrain the language adopted for
specifying the role policies. On the contrary, it promotes the adoption of
diﬀerent languages and ontologies, giving agents the possibility to choose the
best one according to their computational model and reasoning capabilities. In
particular, an XML-based description equipped with suitable ontologies (based
Semantic Web approach) is meant to be adopted in the future, promoting the
use of standard technologies.
Currently, Prolog has been chosen for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, it makes
it possible to describe the policy rules declaratively, providing a good trade-
oﬀ between expressiveness and fast prototyping; then, it promotes reasoning
for agents with cognitive and deliberative capabilities; ﬁnally, for engineering
reasons, since tuProlog engines are already exploited as key components of
some core parts of the TuCSoN infrastructure. 6
4.2 Some Examples
Suppose now we need to setup a blackboard-based agent society, where any
agent can insert and read tuples msg(M ) as messages on the bboard tuple centre,
but only administrators can remove them. So, a suitable role policy for users
could be :
can do( , bboard ? out(msg( )), ).
can do( , bboard ? rd(msg( )), ).
Instead, for administrators:
can do( , bboard ? , ).
Then, consider a slightly variation of previous example, in which the tuple
centre msg box is used to exchange messages msg(DestID,Content ). Any user can
6 tuProlog is an open source Java-based Prolog. Current documentation and devel-
opment can be found at tuProlog web sites: http://tuprolog.sourceforge.net and
http://lia.deis.unibo.it/research/tuprolog
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Fig. 4. Workﬂow management taken as example, concerning a purchase order execution.
send messages to any other one, but can retrieve only messages sent to him.
A suitable user policy could be then:
can do( , msg box ? out(msg(DestID,Content )), ).
can do( , msg box ? in(msg(DestID,Content )), ):-
agent id(DestID ).
An ACC with a lease time T can be easily modelled with the rule:
can do( , , ):- session time(ST), ST < T.
Finally, as example of context-aware policy:
can do( , Tid ? out( ), ):- local node(Node ).
The rule asserts that only agents located at the node Node can insert tuples
into the tuple centre Tid .
5 Workﬂow Management as a Case Study
Distributed workﬂow management is a relevant application domain heavily
based on coordination. A workﬂow is an activity involving the coordinated
execution of multiple tasks performed by diﬀerent processing entities. These
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tasks could be manual or automated in nature. A workﬂow process is an auto-
mated organisational process involving both human and automated tasks. A
workﬂow management system (WfMS) is a set of tools that provide support
for process deﬁnition, workﬂow enactment – by means of workﬂow engines exe-
cuting workﬂow speciﬁcation – and administration and monitoring of workﬂow
processes.
On the one side, RBAC models (not based on agents) have already been
proposed for specifying and managing security in these systems at an organi-
sational level [1,3], and on the other side agent-based coordination infrastruc-
tures have been already investigated for engineering workﬂow management
systems [18].
Here we consider a simple workﬂow example – a portion of a purchasing
workﬂow, described in [3] – to give an idea of how the TuCSoN extended
model could be eﬀective in specifying and enforcing role-based access control
in a workﬂow environment application. Fig. 4 graphically depicts the example,
as it appears in [3]. Each task on the diagram is divided into three sections:
(1) the description of the task (in bold type), (2) the document being used
(between square brackets), (3) the organisational position of the agent per-
forming task (in italics). On the completion of a task, the workﬂow engine
determines the next task to be initiated, by evaluating the predicates shown
in parenthesis on the line connecting tasks.
In the workﬂow discussed, a buyer will complete a purchase order (Task
2) based on the requisition form prepared by the stock controller (Task 1).
Thereafter an accountant will determine the availability of funds (Task 3).
Should funds be available, the next step is determined by the value of the order.
Orders in excess of 10000 are forwarded to the accounts payable manager for
approval (Task 4), whereas smaller orders are immediately sent to the supplier
by the buyer (Task 5).
Engineering the workﬂow upon TuCSoN calls for using tuple centres as
workﬂow engines, and agents for the execution of the individual tasks. Fig. 5
shows a schema reporting a simpliﬁed analysis and design of the case study
in TuCSoN, describing roles, tasks under their responsibility, interaction pro-
tocols with the tuple centre used as workﬂow engine (call it we), and the
role policies. Table 1 shows the workﬂow speciﬁcation expressed in ReSpecT
language, deﬁning the behaviour of the we tuple centre. Basically, a stock
controller provides for a new requisition form by inserting requisitionForm
tuples. These tuples can be collected by buyers, who issue new orders by in-
serting tuples of kind order, with information about the order. The insertion
of these tuples triggers – by means of ReSpecT reactions deﬁning workﬂow
speciﬁcation – checking fund task; this task is taken in charge by an accoun-
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Role Task Protocol
stockController Create a requisition
form
out(requisitionForm(F))
buyer Create a purchase
order
in(requisitionForm(F))
out(order(Id,Info))
rd(order_state(Id,State))
accountant Check funds for
order
in(check_fund(OrderId))
out(check_fund_result(OrderId,Res))
accountsPayable
Manager
Approve orders in(check_approval(OrderId))
out(check_approval_result(OrderId,Res))
Role Policy
stockController can_do(_,out(requisitionForm(F)),_).
buyer can_do(init,in(requisitionForm(F)), + doOrd(F)).
can_do(doOrd(F),out(order(Id,Info)),checkOrd(Id)).
can_do(checkOrd(Id),rd(order(Id,Info)),_).
can_do(checkOrd(Id),rd(order_state(Id,State)),_).
accountant can_do(init,in(check_fund(OrdId)),chechFund(OrdId)).
can_do(checkFund(OrdId),rd(order(OrdId,Info)),_).
can_do(checkFund(OrdId),out(check_fund_result(OrdId,Res)),
init).
accountsPayable
Manager
can_do(init,in(check_approval(OrdId)), + checkAppr(OrdId)).
can_do(checkAppr(OrdId),rd(order(OrdId,Info)),_).
can_do(checkAppr(OrdId),out(check_approval_result(OrdId,Res)),
init).
Fig. 5. (Top) Roles identiﬁed in the workﬂow example, and related role policies (Bottom).
tant, retrieving tuples of type check fund and producing result in terms of
check fund result tuples. According to the result and the amount of the or-
der, the approval task can be triggered and executed by any accounts payable
agent. In any case, the state of the order is traced with order state tuples,
which can be read by buyers.
The relevant part of the example for this paper concerns role policies. In
the example quite strict rules are adopted: stock controllers can interact with
we tuple centres only by inserting requisitionForm tuples; only buyers can
retrieve requitisionForm tuples, and issue new orders by inserting order
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reaction(out(order(Id,Info)),( % when a new order is inserted, the check fund task
out r(check fund(Id)))). % is triggered, by inserting the proper tuple
reaction(out(check fund result(Id,yes)),( % if the check fund task completes positively
in r(check fund result(Id,yes)), % and the order amount is less than
rd r(order(Id,amount(V))), % 10000, then the order state is updated
accordingly,
V <= 10000, % reporting the positive execution of the order
out r(order state(Id,ok)))).
reaction(out(check fund result(Id,yes)),( % if the check fund task completes with a
in r(check fund result(Id,yes)), % positive result and the order amount is greater
rd r(order(Id,amount(V))), % than 10000, then the order approval task is
V > 10000, % triggered by inserting the proper tuple
out r(check approval(Id)))).
reaction(out(check fund result(Id,no)),( % if the check fund task completes with
in r(check fund result(Id,no)), % a negative result, then the order state tuple
out r(order state(Id,no funds)))). % is updated accordingly
reaction(out(check approval result(Id,yes)),( % if the order approval task completes
in r(check approval result(Id,yes)), % positively, the order state tuple is
out r(order state(Id,ok)))). % updated accordingly, reporting order
% execution
reaction(out(check approval result(Id,no)),(% if the order approval task completes with
in r(check approval result(Id,no)), % a negative result, then the order state tuple
out r(order state(Id,not approved)))). % is updated accordingly, reporting order
% failure
Table 1
Workﬂow speciﬁcation expressed in the ReSpecT language, deﬁning the behaviour of the we tuple
centre.
tuples. A buyer then is allowed to inspect the state of the order by reading
tuples order state: note that he/she can access information about only the
orders he/she is responsible for. A + doOrd is used to allow buyers to follow
multiple orders at a time. Accountants are allowed to check funds for orders,
and are forced to read and provide information only about the orders they
took in charge. The policy allows an accountant to consider one check at a
time, assuming that the task would be not so time consuming. The same
policy applies for accounts payable managers, with the diﬀerence that they
can follow multiple checks at a time (as long tasks).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the RBAC model for engineering some security
and organisation aspects in the context of MAS. For this purpose, we exploited
the Agent Coordination Context notion to extend the TuCSoN coordination
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infrastructure with an RBAC-like architecture.
Adopting an RBAC-like approach makes it possible to gain all the beneﬁts
of the approach in engineering security inside complex MAS organisations,
mainly in terms of encapsulation of the security policies, and ﬂexibility in
their management. ACCs have been the key for porting the model on top of
our existing infrastructure, integrating coordination, organisation and security
in a coherent way. The resulting security and organisation model provides
features that are essential for the engineering of open MAS, namely:
Dynamism / Flexibility — Agents can enter and exit from organisations,
dynamically activating / deactivating roles by (re)negotiating ACCs. Also,
the organisation structure is meant to be changeable / adaptable at runtime,
by adding and removing roles (societies and society classes) and changing
the role policy.
Support for Heterogeneity — In the same way as TuCSoN coordination
model, the RBAC-like model is neutral with respect to the speciﬁc agent
computational model and platform. Then, the approach can be used to
deﬁne and enforce access control both for reactive and intelligent / cogni-
tive agents, belonging to diﬀerent agent platforms and using TuCSoN for
coordination purposes.
Veriﬁcation of Formal Properties — The RBAC architecture makes it
easy to conceive a framework for veriﬁcation of security and organisation
properties, by well separating and encapsulating security policies. Proper-
ties concerning role activation and separation of duties can be veriﬁed by
focusing on the agent-role and role-role relationships, ruling the ACC nego-
tiation process. In our framework this will be possible after a formalisation
of the organisation model (structures and rules) reported in [15], which is
an ongoing work. Instead, properties concerning access control and, more
generally, the safe / correct execution of interaction protocols could be ver-
iﬁed focusing on ACC behaviour, as composition of individual role policies.
This is already possible, given the formal semantics deﬁned for ACC [16].
Even if the RBAC approach has been applied in the context of the TuCSoN in-
frastructure, indeed this paper points out its suitability for MAS infrastructure
in general: for the purpose the ACC abstraction and a related infrastructure
layer can be exploited to integrate any agent middleware with an RBAC-like
architecture.
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work considering the appli-
cation of RBAC models in the context of MAS. Abundant literature exists
concerning role-based approaches for MAS analysis and design [22,6,10], on
the role concept and formalisation in open agent societies [12]. Mainly, these
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approaches focus on the organisation issues, without taking into account –
at a model and engineering level – the integration with security and access
control.
In [23], an RBAC-like approach is used to realise a policy enforcement co-
ordination model, based on tuple spaces. In particular, infrastructural entities
called Proxies are used both for applying role-based access control on agents
interactions – including both inter-agent communication and agent-tuple space
interaction –, and for enforcing coordination policies on tuple spaces. The
ACC abstraction shares some features with the Proxy entity, since it is the
runtime abstraction responsible of enforcing role-based access control on agent
actions. Unlike a Proxy, an ACC is dynamically negotiated, created and re-
leased to a speciﬁc agent, not shared among agents. The ACC is primarily an
organisation abstraction: it is used to rule agent actions (protocols) according
to its role(s), and not to enforce coordination policy as in the case of Proxy:
in our case tuple centres are – as coordination artifacts – the abstraction in
charge to encapsulate and enforce coordination laws. Also, the ACC is meant
to specify and enforce not only individual actions, but policies, as patterns
of actions (protocols). Finally – in TuCSoN in particular – the ACC abstrac-
tion is meant to rule agent-tuple centre interaction, not only direct inter-agent
communication (as in the case of Proxies), since direct communication is not
accounted for by the TuCSoN model.
ACCs are somewhat similar in their ruling and controlling action to Con-
trollers as deﬁned in Law Governed Interaction (LGI) [11]. Generally speak-
ing, LGI is a message-exchange mechanism which allows an open group of
distributed agents to engage in a mode of interaction governed by an explic-
itly speciﬁed and strictly enforced policy, the interaction law of the group.
Law enforcement is decentralised, and carried out by a distributed set of con-
trollers, one for each member of the community. As the LGI controller, the
ACC enforces rules constraining the action/perception space of the agent ex-
ploiting it, enabling the enactment of policies that are local to the agent. In
our approach, global coordination policies – meant to model laws about the
society as a whole, not related to speciﬁc agent actions but to the global agent
interaction space – are embedded and enforced by the coordination artifacts
(tuple centres).
Ongoing work is devoted for completing and tuning the implementation
of TuCSoN extended with ACC, and for stressing the validity of the model
by implementing MAS on top of it [20]. 7 In particular, we will reconsider
7 TuCSoN is an open source project. Current documentation and develop-
ment can be found at TuCSoN web sites: http://tucson.sourceforge.net and
http://lia.deis.unibo.it/research/tucson.
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systems previously engineered on top of TuCSoN, such as distributed workﬂow
management systems [18], and we will re-engineer them – or better, their
organisation and security assets – with the new RBAC support.
Future work will investigate the possibility to integrate research issues
about roles, institutions and access control theory developed in the context
of agent-based organisation within our RBAC-like framework, in particular
as far as the notions of obligation and normative system are concerned [2].
Finally, future work will be also devoted to complete the formal framework,
by adding the formal speciﬁcation of the RBAC architecture as deﬁned in this
paper to the formal ACC model.
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